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ABSTRACT
As healthcare data are pushed online, consumers have raised big concerns on the breach of their
personal information. Law and regulations have placed businesses and organizations under
obligations to take actions to prevent data breach. Among various threats, insider threats have
been identified as a major threat on data loss. Thus, effective mechanisms to control insider
threats on data loss are urgently needed. The objective of this research is to address data loss
prevention challenges in healthcare enterprise environment. First, a novel approach is provided to
model internal threat, specifically inside activities. With inside activities modeling, data loss paths
and threat vectors are formally described and identified. Then, threat vectors and potential data
loss paths have been investigated in a healthcare enterprise environment. Threat vectors have
been enumerated and data loss statistics data for some threat vectors have been collected. After
that, issues on data loss prevention and inside activity incident identification, tracking, and
reconstruction are discussed. Finally, evidences of inside activities are modeled as evidence trees to
provide guidance for inside activity identification, tracking, and reconstruction.
1. INTRODUCTION
As healthcare data are pushed online,
consumers have raised big concerns on the
breach of their personal information. Law and
regulations have placed businesses and
organizations under obligations to take actions
to prevent data breach. Among various
threats, insider threats have been identified as
a major threat on data loss. Thus, effective
mechanisms to control insider threats on data
loss are urgently needed. The objective of this
research is to address data loss prevention
challenges in healthcare enterprise
environment. First, a novel approach is
provided to model internal threat, specifically
inside activities. With inside activities
modeling, data loss paths and threat vectors
are formally described and identified. Then,
threat vectors and potential data loss paths
have been investigated in a healthcare
enterprise environment. Threat vectors have
been enumerated and data loss statistics data
for some threat vectors have been collected.
After that, issues on data loss prevention and
inside activity incident identification, tracking,
and reconstruction are discussed. Finally,
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evidences of inside activities are modeled as
evidence trees to provide guidance for inside
activity identification, tracking, and
reconstruction
2. SYSTEM MODEL
An abstraction of classical healthcare
enterprise environment is modeled as a multi-
tier system that consists of multiple data
access or management parties, including a data
module, service providers, business users, data
management team, and client party. The
overview of the system is shown in Figure 1.
The data module is a central and critical part
of this architecture and is composed of a data
storage system, a data process module, and a
data access module. The data storage module
is essentially databases and files that contain
the information to be protected. The data
process module is composed of a healthcare
information system which process the
information stored in the data storage module
for business clients, patients, government
agencies, and healthcare service providers. The
data access module is essentially web based
interfaces for users. The service provider party
is composed of different services that are
provided by the healthcare business, including
hospital services, lab test services, health
prevention care services, disease diagnosis and
treatment services, nursing, etc. These services
involve many human users such as doctors,
technicians, and nurses. The business party is
essentially the interactions between the
healthcare business entity and other entities
such as other healthcare service providers,
government agencies, insurance companies,
healthcare equipment/pharmacy providers.
The data management party is essentially the
IT teams including
database/web/network/computer system
administers, and the security/compliance team.
The client party is essentially the patients and
their legal guardians.
In this research, the data items to be
protected by using data loss prevention
mechanisms include personal health
information (PHI) such as social security num-
bers (SSNs), data of birth, payment data,
insurance policy information in digital format,
and personal electronic health records (EHRs),
as well as business data such as business client
information. In this architecture, the data
module is interacted with other modules, for
example, databases and file systems are
managed by the database administers,
protected by system and network
administrators as well as the
security/compliance team. The service module
and the business module will not only read the
information stored in the data module, it will
also create and update the records in the data
module. In most cases, the client module will
only read the information stored in the data
module such as patient’s health record and
payment information.
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Figure.1. An architecture overview of the healthcare enterprise system.
3. RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Inside Activity Identification
Methods
In order to develop an effective method to
identify inside activities from regular business
activities, in this paper, two methods will be
introduced to formally describe the relationship
between inside activities and regular business
activities. 1). The Work Role-Data Asset-User
Operation-Access Preference (WDOA) model
and, 2). The User-Operation-Data Asset-
Access Path (UODP) model.
3.1.1 The WDOA (Work Role-
Data Asset-User Operation-
Access Preference) Model
In a well-managed healthcare enterprise
environment, appropriate security policy and
acceptable user policy should be in place and
enforced by policy based access control (Chen,
Laih, Pouget, & Dacier, 2005; Ellard &
Megquier, 2004; Johnson & Willey, 2011;
Murphey, 2007). For such a healthcare
information system, denoted as Ω., the inside
activity model WDOA can be defined as below.
Definition 1.1 (user): A user ui  U =
{u1, u2, …, uL}, where L  0 and 0  i  L, is
a specific subject to access and consume
recourses in Ω to perform tasks defined by the
work role, where L denote the number of users
in Ω.
A user in Ω is a specific subject who can
be a doctor, a nurse, a business user, an
information technology staff, or a non-empty
set of software processes in Ω.
Definition 1.2 (work role): A work role
wi W = {w1, w2, …, wM}, where M  0 and 0
 i  M, is a group of users who have the
same type of tasks and the same set of
privileges to access and consume recourses in Ω
to perform tasks, where M denote the number
of work roles in Ω.
A work role in Ω can be doctor, nurse,
business users, information technology staff, or
a non-empty set of software processes in Ω.
Each user ui should have a well-defined work
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role wi and been assigned with data access
privilege based on the need-to-know principle.
Definition 1.3 (sensitive asset): An
asset di D = {d1, d2, …, dN}, where N  0 and
0  i  N, is a category of resource that is
owned by owner of Ω and can be consumed by
user, where N denote the number of resource
categories in Ω.
The healthcare business should identify its
own set of assets D. For example, user
accounts, computer and network resources, and
protected healthcare information. Also, the
healthcare data should be classified into
different sensitive levels, and the set of
sensitive levels is denoted as S, where S = {s1,
s2, …, sm}.  Each data object in D, di, is
assigned a sensitive label sj. A data item that
is labeled as si has higher sensitive level than a
data item that is labeled as sj if i > j. To fulfill
tasks defined by the work role, a user accesses
sensitive assets with certain preference. Let A
denote the set of preference level where A =
{a1, a2, …, an}, then the sensitive access
preference can be defined by a set of 2-tuples,
(di, aj). A data item with access preference ai is
accessed with higher frequency than a data
item with access preference aj if i > j, and a1 is
defined as the lowest access preference, e.g.,
zero access preference.
Definition 1.4 (operation): An
operation oi  O = {o1, o2, …, oΖ}, where Z  0
and 0  i  Z, is a user activity to access or
consume resources defined in Ω, where Z
denote the total number of operations that can
be performed by work roles defined in Ω.
The specific operations in O include read,
write, execute, delete, shutdown, print, copy,
and any other operation that is defined in a
specific business sector. Based on the
preference levels, some operations will be
performed regularly, and some should rarely be
performed or may never be performed. For
example, an IT system administrator may have
to copy and move sensitive data objects
around but should not delete or modify
sensitive data objects, and should not copy the
data to personal devices; an application
developer will need to query sensitive data
objects a lot but should not modify sensitive
data. Therefore, a user’s accesses to sensitive
data objects in the healthcare enterprise
environment can be modeled into certain
pattern based on the work role of different
users.
Definition 1 (WDOA Model): The
WDOA Model is a 4-tuple {W, D, O, A} data
access preference model, where the first field
represents a work role in W, the second field
represents an asset in D,  the third field
represents an operation in O, and the last field
represents an access preference in A.
The WDOA Model can give a hint on
whether a data access activity is normal or
not. However, the WDOA model cannot
precisely determine whether an access activity
is an inside activity or not. For example,
application developer should have access
preference a1 to user account information, and
any access to such data would be suspicious.
An IT administrator has low access preference
ai (i > 1) to personal healthcare records for
data management purpose, and a copy access
to those data items cannot determine whether
such access is suspicious or not.
3.1.2 The UODP (User-
Operation-Data Asset-Access
Path) Model
An inside activity model UODP is defined for
an arbitrary healthcare information system Ω.
In such a model, to reach a sensitive asset di,
an insider needs to have known or unknown
access paths to asset di (Ellard & Megquier,
2004; Kowalski et al, 2008; Moore, Cappelli, &
Trzeciak,  2008).
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Definition 2.1 (access path): An access
path pi  P = {p1, p2, …, pK},where K  0 and
0  i  K, denote the access channels or
access media for users to access or consume
assets in the healthcare enterprise
environment,  where K is number of access
paths enabled in Ω.
A specific access path can be USB access,
CD access, VM instance access, email access,
or any other access mechanism that allows
users to access the sensitive asset, in
legitimately way or illegitimately way. For
example, to steal an asset di for personal use,
an insider may copy asset di from the data
storage site and then send to a personal USB
device that has been attached to a system
within a healthcare enterprise environment. An
insider may first create secret user account and
setup a virtual machine (VM) instance, and
then copy di to the VM instance to be accessed
later. Let Path({ui}, k) denote the set of access
paths to asset dk by a subset of users {ui}, then
Path({ui}, k) can be defined by a set of 4-
tuples (ui, oj, dk, pm).
Definition 2 (UODP Model): The
UODP Model is a 4-tuple {U, O, D, P} data
access path model, Where the first field
represents a user in U, the second field
represents an operation in O, the third field
represents an asset in D, and the last field
represents an access path in P.
With the 4-tuples (U, O, D, P) model, it is
possible to determine whether an access
activity is an inside activity or not. An
application developer ui copy healthcare
records dk to a un-monitored VM instance, the
4-tuples (application developer, copy, dk, un-
monitored virtual machine) can be definitely
considered as a suspicious inside activity since
an un-monitored VM instance is beyond the
control of the healthcare enterprise and can
lead to data loss of dk. While an IT system
administrator ui copy healthcare records dk to
a monitored USB device, the 4-tuples (IT
system administrator, copy, dk, monitored
USB) is not an inside activity since the
monitored USB device is still under the control
of the healthcare enterprise and will not lead
to data loss of dk at the current stage. With
sufficient resources, the elements in U, O, D
can be well classified and identified based on
current technologies. However, due to the
complexity of the healthcare information
system, data storage techniques, user access
controls, and usage obligations, the
identification and classification of access paths
is still challenging to for healthcare enterprises.
3.2 Inside Activity Modeling for
Incident Tracking and
Reconstruction
The attack tree approach that is first proposed
by Schneier (1999) is used to systematically
analyze security threats. Attacks are modeled
and represented by a tree structure where the
root node represents the final goal, other
interior nodes represent subgoals, and leaf
nodes are attacking approaches to achieve the
final goal (Poolsapassit & Ray, 2007). Children
of a node in the tree can be one of the two
logical types: AND and OR. To reach the goal,
all of its AND children, or at least one of its
OR children, must be accomplished. Attack
trees grow incrementally by time and they
capture knowledge in a reusable form. First,
possible attack goals must be identified. Each
attack goal becomes the root of its own attack
tree. Construction continues by considering all
possible attacks against the given goal. These
attacks form the AND and OR children of the
goal. Next, each of these attacks becomes a
goal and their children are generated. Figure 2
shows an example of an attack tree of the
inside threat, “achieving the root privilege”. In
such an attack, the attacker is a regular user
and has a lower access privilege to the target
(which needs root privilege), and conducts a
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series of attacking operations to achieve the
root privilege as the system user. Note that
links that are connected with a line represents
the “AND” relationship among the states or
sub-goals, which are working together to
achieve the same parent goal.
Figure 2. An attack tree of an internal threat “achieving the root privilege”.
4. DATA LOSS RESULTS
AND ANALYSIS
Based on the UODP access model, if a
legitimate user accesses and operates
sensitive data through an uncontrolled access
path, it can lead to potential data loss. The
combination of such uncontrolled access
paths and access operations are threats to
data loss, and are defined as the data loss
threat vectors. Therefore, to prevent and
control data loss in healthcare enterprise
environment, the first critical task is to
identify the set of data loss threat vectors,
more specifically, the set of uncontrolled
access paths. In this research, we will explore
the potential threat vectors in the healthcare
enterprise environment. Safend Data
Protection Suite, an end point security
product from Wave, has been used in this
research to regulate data loss prevention in
an enterprise healthcare environment. Data
loss results are collected before and after the
placement and enforcement of end point
security protection. To identify data loss
threat vectors, examine potential data loss
threats, and to analyze potential data loss
controls, the following studies will be
conducted. First, potential threat vectors will
be enumerated and feasible operation
controls will be listed for each threat vector.
The status of the enforcement of such
controls is also indicated. Second, statistical
data loss prevention results are provided.
4.1 Data Loss Threat Vectors
Identification
Data loss threat vectors can be categorized
as external storage media and transmission
media. External hard disks, USB flash drives,
PDA’s, CD/DVD, floppy disks, and tapes
are traditional storage media, while cell
phones, SD card readers, IPAD, FTP, web
sites, and printing can be categorized as
transmission media. The only exception is
cloud storage which is a new technology
combining transmission and storage. To
control data operations data, port controls
such as block, allow, force encryption, set to
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read only are enforced. Data filtering
technologies based on expressions are
deployed to filter sensitive data such as
credit card numbers, social security numbers,
and healthcare records. The results are
shown in Table 1.
Table 1
The enumeration of data loss threat vectors in an enterprise healthcare environment
Threat Vectors Port Control Options Enforcement Status
External Hard Drives
Block/Allow/Force
Encryption/Set To Read Only Enforced
USB Flash Drives
Block/Allow/Force
Encryption/Set To Read Only Enforced
Cell Phones Block/Allow Not Implemented
PDA's Block/Allow Enforced as external storage media
SD Card Readers Block/Allow/Set To Read Only Not Implemented
iPad Block/Allow Not Implemented
CD/DVD
Block/Allow/Force
Encryption/Set To Read Only Enforced
Floppy Drives Block/Allow
No data to report - technology in
environment does not allow for floppy
drives
Tape Drives Block/Allow
No data to report - technology in
environment does not allow for tape drives
Websites none
Due to product, high administration efforts
to identify and analyze risks.
FTP none
Blocked by perimeter within the domain,
by static IP, site IP allowed to use, and
user security - 3 factor authentications.
Cloud Storage none Not Implemented
Email none
Email filtering, algorithms to look for
sensitive data, will force encryption
Printing
can block physical printers
from connecting, but not
network printers Not Implemented
As indicated in table 1, traditional
storage media are usually well controlled by
enforcing port controls, since they have been
well documented and the monitoring and
control technologies have been well designed.
Cloud storage is a new technology and not
well documented (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010;
Bruening & Treacy, 2009; Brunette & Mogull,
2009), thus, mature control technologies are
not ready yet. Some transmission media such
as FTP can easily be controlled since FTP
can easily be replaced with an alternative
secure technology. It means that these
technologies are not required to accomplish
healthcare activities and thus can be blocked.
Some other transmission media such as
printing are not easily controlled since
printing is required for routine business
activities. Also, due to the nature of printing
(graphical presentation of information),
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sophisticated identification and examine
technologies are needed to filter sensitive
data. Currently, efficient deployment of such
technologies has not been ready yet.
4.1 Data Loss Analysis
A 90-day time period data collection is
conducted prior to the deployment of any
end point security protection technology
(denoted as /P). After the 90-day time
period, Safend Security Protection Suite was
deployed in the enterprise healthcare
environment to control data loss. Then, a 90-
day time period data collection is conducted
with the deployment of the end point
security protection technology (denoted as
/A). Due to the limitation of the technology
and the feasibility of the policy enforcement
in the enterprise environment, only part of
the threat vectors, USB, CD/DVD, external
hard disk, and phone, are controlled.
Table 2
The potential data loss path accesses and operations before and after the deployment of Safend.
Threat Vector
#
Users/P
#
Users/A # Files/P # Files/A
Data
Size/P
Data
Size/A
USB 2765 413 4449429 374015 1123 G 432.4G
CD/DVD 157 44 212067 8530 291.7 G 76.5G
External Hard Disk 161 21 443805 9356 804.39 G 2.4G
Phone 426 5805 0 0 0 0
As indicated in Table 2, the number of
users access potential data loss threat vectors,
such as USB, CD/DVD, and external hard
disks have been significantly reduced (USB
users from 2765 to 413, CD/DVD users from
157 to 44, external hard disk users from 161
to 21). The only exception is the use of
phone and the usage has been significantly
increased (from 426 to 5805). One reason
could be the block or reluctance of the use of
email and other controlled communication
paths. However, users may plug in to charge
devices without proper removable media
protection, phones can be used to taking
pictures and then transmitted out without
control. Therefore, such an abrupt increase
needs to be carefully analyzed and better to
conduct a thorough investigation. A
countermeasure to such data loss threat
through phone can be achieved to enforce
non-personal phone policy in sensitive
working environment. As indicated by the
number of files and the size of files moved in
Table 2, employees tend to abuse such threat
vector accesses and operations without data
loss control, since such significant reductions
(for examples, the number of USB accessed
files from 4449429 to 374015, the number of
CD/DVD accessed files from 212067 to 8530,
the number of external disk accessed files
from 443805 to 9536) does not affect business
activities in the enterprise healthcare
environment. Please note that no data is
transferred to phones due to the reason that
most phones when connected are seen as
removable storage or external hard drives,
and thus will adhere to the policies already
enforced for that media type. In Table 3, it
indicates that a large part of accesses are
encrypted, which can significantly reduce the
potential of unintentional data loss due to
theft, mis-sent, and misconfiguration.
However, there are some accesses and
operations are unencrypted but all of them
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are approved. As stated in the security usage
policy and recorded in the usage logs, such
approved usages are required to follow
predesigned processes such that all files
accessed and operations on files are all logged
in audit reports.
Table 3
The encrypted and unencrypted data loss path accesses and operations after the deployment of Safend
Threat Vector
#
Users/A
#
Files/A
Data
Size/A
#
Users/A # Files/A
Data
Size/A
Encrypted Use Unencrypted Use
USB 187 247680 334 226 126335 98.4
CD/DVD 32 N/A 64.6 12 N/A 11.9
Ext. Hard Disk N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phone N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
5. INSIDER ACTIVITY
IDENTIFICATION &
TRACKING
Even with data loss threat vectors
identification, control, and monitoring, inside
activities cannot be detected or identified
with current access control techniques since
the access operation and access path are both
legitimate user privileges. Therefore, forensics
investigation on inside activities in
healthcare enterprise environment, including
incident detection and reconstruction is
critically needed (Tu et al, 2012). Current
research on inside threat detection and
identification (Eberle & Holder, 2009; Moore,
Cappelli, & Trzeciak, 2008; Phua, Lee,
Smith, & Gayler, 2007) and event
reconstruction mechanisms (Case et al, 2008;
Tang, & Daniels, 2005; Tu et al, 2012) are
limited in real world since they require a
comprehensive set of information including
social information and explicit dependence
knowledge, which are not available in an
enterprise environment. Hence, a novel
mechanisms are critical to identify potential
inside activity and reconstruct the inside
activity for tracking.
5.1 Data Loss Identification
With deployment of end point security
protection product such as Safend Security
Protection Suite, it is possible to control data
loss through traditional external storage
media. For example, with appropriate access
control, any data accessed can be logged and
can be blocked to be moved to USB storage
media or other external storage media.
However, potential uncontrolled data loss
access paths could still exist.
(1) A combination of multiple access
technologies in the extended healthcare
enterprise environment. For the purpose of
business trip, an employee ui with work role
wj (e.g., sales representative) may need to
move data (e.g., dn) outside of the enterprise
network by applying access operation (i.e.,
copy), and such access has a high access
preference for wj. Then, based on the WDOA
model, the 4-tuple (sales representative, dn,
copy, high access preference), will be defined
as a legitimate access without an alert. By
applying UODP, it can help to detect
potential data loss due to access violations.
End point security product can monitor
regular access to the data and any violation
(e.g., copy dn to an unauthorized personnel
USB device pm) may result in an alert since
the union of copy and pm (copy  pm) has
been pre-defined as data loss threat vector.
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In this way, the combination of UODP and
end security protection product together can
create an extended enterprise environment
outside the physical enterprise network
boundary. However, there will be other
techniques available to bypass the control.
For example, employee can photograph the
data if the read access is permitted, or
storage media can be bit-by-bit imaged
without leaving any evidence on the media if
it is connected through write block devices.
(2) Forgotten paths due to unsuccessful
change management. For example,
misconfiguration could be unnoticed during
system update, security product update, or
human resource change. With such
misconfiguration, media block and media
access log may not be enabled.
(3) A combination of uncontrolled
accesses within the physical network of
healthcare enterprise environment.  In Table
1, some access technologies, such as web site,
phone, and cloud technology, have not been
controlled. As analyzed in the above section,
phone technology has the potential to result
in data loss. With appropriate surveillance
technology deployed, such data loss access
path can be monitored and detected. Cloud
technology, web site, and local virtualization
technology can provide a perfect uncontrolled
data loss access path. Local data can be
moved between physical storage within the
network and a local VM instance, which can
then connect to remote private cloud storage
website. With this secret path, data
encrypted in the VM instance can be moved
outside the physical network boundary of the
healthcare business. After the local VM
instance deleted, little evidence will be left
within the boundary of the healthcare
enterprise network. The only feasible control
is to block any encrypted traffic (Wippich,
2007).
5.2 Inside Activity Operation and
Evidence Modeling
Inside activity identification and track
require that inside activities to be thoroughly
studied. In such study, inside activities will
be modeled as attack tree and then
conducted in a simulated environment and a
forensic investigation will be followed for
each attack successfully committed.
Fingerprints will be located and identified for
each operation of the inside activity. The
metadata of the fingerprints of each attack
operation, such as log name, format, location,
timestamps, and security features. are
composed into nodes, which will then become
child nodes of the leaf nodes in the
augmented attack tree. This entire process
will finally result in an evidence tree for each
inside activity studied. Fingerprints of
sensitive operations of the evidence trees will
be identified as incident identifiers and the
evidence tree can provide the contextual
information to reconstruct security incidents
automatically.
In this research, two inside activities
have been studied, both of which utilize
removable media (USB drive and CD-ROM)
as the access paths leading to data loss in the
healthcare enterprise environment.
5.2.1 Inside Activity Operation
Modeling
Inside Activity A, as shown in Figure 2, is
a typical industrial espionage inside activity.
In such incident, the insider has all the
needed privileges to access data and the USB
ports which are required to perform the
user’s duty. However, those sensitive data
should not be copied to personal USB devices
since this may result in potential information
leakage. To perform such an attack, the user
is logged into system with all needed
privileges, navigate to sensitive data, copy
and paste the sensitive data into the USB
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device.  The USB device is then removed and the user is logged out of the system later.
Inside Activity B, as shown in Figure
3, is also a typical industrial espionage inside
attack. In such an attack, the attacker has
all the needed privileges to access sensitive
data and to access the CD-ROM Drive,
which is needed to perform the user’s duty.
However, those sensitive data should not be
copied to CD-ROM since this may result in
potential information leakage. To perform
such an attack, the user can log into system
with all needed privileges and navigate to
sensitive data, and then burns the sensitive
data onto a CD-ROM. The CD-ROM is then
removed and the user is logged out of the
system.
Figure 2. Case Two Internal Attack A (USB copy)
Figure 3. Case Two Internal Attack B (CD-Rom copy attack)
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5.2.2 Inside Activity Evidence
Modeling
The results of Attack A and Attack B are
shown in Figures 4 and 5. Each figure
contains an augmented threat tree that
represents the vulnerability exploited, the
steps needed to exploit it, the attacker's
operations, and the fingerprint generated by
those operations. The final goal of both
attacks is to steal sensitive information from
a business information system with desired
system permissions. Operations conducted on
a Windows machine may leave some forensic
traces in the registry, some are persistent for
a long time and some are volatile. If a piece
of registry fingerprint is coupled with
information from the event logs and file
systems, the insider attack may be tracked
and reconstructed. Based on our observation,
relevant fingerprints can be located in
machine’s System hive, Software hive, the
user’s NTuser.dat hive, the setupapi.log that
keeps a history of all devices installed via
plug and play, and the Security event log.
The inside attack A is conducted on
7/29/2011. Based on information in the
registry, at 1:03:39 AM, a Centon USB
device with a serial number of 6AFA4AAD80
was attached to the machine. At 1:04:34 AM,
the attack was logged into the system and
left fingerprints in the security event log.
Based on additional fingerprints in the
registry, the USB device with serial number
6AFA4AAD80 can be linked with the disk
with driver letter E. Examining the
RecentDocs registry key with the tool
RegExtract shows that _USBSTOR.sql,
Removable Disk (E:), _USB.sql, and a file
named “highly sensitive things” which is
flagged in the honeypot as a sensitive file,
were recently accessed. At 1:14:44 AM, User
synchronized the document titled with
“highly sensitive things”, with the Removable
Figure 4. A part of the evidence tree for Inside Activity A.
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Disk (E:).  The evidence tree of attack A is
shown in Figure 4.
The inside attack B is conducted on
7/29/2011. Based on fingerprints in the
security event log, user Worker 2 logged into
the system at 5:46: 26, and attempted to
create a hard link with “highly sensitive very
sensitive” at 5:53:12. Analysis of the IDE
Device Class registry shows that a CD ROM
was documented at 5:47:34, a minute after
Worker 2 logged on to the system. Finally,
the user Worker 2 is found to burn the file
“highly sensitive things” to the CD ROM at
5:53:12. The evidence tree of attack B is
shown in Figure 5.
Now we discuss how to determine the
incident identifiers for the two inside
activities. To perform the job allowed for a
user’s work role, the operation and access
path of an inside activity are allowed and
cannot be prevented, thus, any individual
operation on data and access path cannot
identify an inside activity. One approach is
to apply the UODP model and utilize the
contextual information of the incident such
as a joint of the operations of data access
and path access (e.g., copy di  access USB)
to identify a potential inside activity.
Operations on sensitive assets can be labeled
as safe or highly risky for each work role wi,
and can be defined by a tuple {{W, O, D,
P}, R}, where R defines the risk levels.
Hence, a risk table containing entries of
{{W, O, D, P}, R} can be developed for
each service. Once a risky operation (e.g.,
copy di) has been performed by user ui (with
work role of wj), the ui’s operations will be
tracked to look for an operation pi (an access
path) associate with di (e.g., USB access 
Figure 5. A part of the evidence tree for Inside Activity B
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CD access  email access) performed by ui.
If the two operations (data access O or
access path P) are discovered, then a
potential inside activity is identified. Since
such combinations cannot be totally
prohibited and the knowledge of such
combinations cannot be obtained from access
control, the detection has to rely on the
logged information in the system.
Another challenge in digital forensics
investigation is the lack of efficient digital
forensics investigation mechanisms. Huge
amount of artifacts of events and operations
are logged in the system, which may
introduce inefficiency to internal incident
tracking and reconstruction. Many of the
security breaches are not investigated due to
the unaffordable effort required to perform a
forensics investigation (Sheyner, 2002;
Todtmann, Riebach, & Rathgeb, 2007; Tu et
al, 2012). Therefore, to improve the
responsiveness and to free businesses and
public organizations’ burden on the incident
report and investigation process, an incident
reconstruction mechanism should be in place
to track inside activity incident
automatically. To automate the
reconstruction of an inside activity incident,
external contextual information is needed to
correlate individual operations of such
incident, which can only be learned from
logged information from the networks and
information systems within the healthcare
enterprise environment. Therefore,
mechanisms such as automatic tracking and
reconstruction of a crime scene should be
designed (Tu et al, 2012).
6. RELATED WORK
Forensics readiness has recently been a big
research concern in digital forensic
investigation and information assurance
(Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Carrier &
Spafford, 2004; Popovsky, Frincke, and
Taylor, 2007; Rowlinson, 2004; Tan, 2001;
Tang & Daniels, 2005; Wilson & Wolfe,
2003; Yasinsac & Manzano, 2001). These
existing research efforts focus on
organization-level framework design such as
policy or management. None of them has
addressed the details of the technology part
of forensics readiness, e.g., mechanisms of the
application and system event logging,
fingerprint storage and archiving, and
evidence-handling procedures, which are
essential to enable forensics readiness for
computer information systems. Our research
presented in this paper attempts to provide a
practical mechanism to automatically
identify, track, and reconstruct attacks or
inside activities, through the identification
and tracking of the evidences of the attacks
or inside activities.
An insider usually has the desired
privilege and does not need to conduct any
malicious activity (or attack) to obtain the
privilege to access sensitive assets. Current
malicious activity monitoring and detection
techniques have limitations to effectively
detect inside activities (Moore, Cappelli, &
Trzeciak, 2008; Tu et al, 2012). Some
research works have attempted to address
inside threat modeling and detection issues
(Bradford, Brown & Perdue, 2004; Burford,
Lewis, & Jakobson, 2008; Chivers, 2009;
Eberle & Holder, 2009). Bradford, Brown, &
Perdue (2004) proposed principles for
proactive computer-system forensics
investigation on security incidents include
internal threats, but no technical
implementation of the proposed principles
has been given and their focus is not threat
detection. Burford, Lewis, & Jakobson (2008)
proposed a comprehensive framework
defining a large set of internal threat
‘observables’, and a graph theory based
method to model individuals’ behavior
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(Chivers, 2009). Eberle & Holder (2009)
proposed an inside activity detection method
in which behavioral events are modeled as
graphs and abnormal behaviors such as
inside activities can be identified by
searching abnormal subgraphs. The above
approaches offer the advantage of modeling
potential attacker and providing interesting
insights into observable behavior (Chivers,
2009). However, their applications are
limited by the availability of social
knowledge of the insiders. Our research,
however, will simply require the locating and
identification the fingerprints left in the
systems by operations of attacks or inside
activities, with the guidance of evidence
models, attack identifiers, and access
preference models.
The WDOA (Work Role-Data Asset-User
Operation-Access Preference) Model and the
UODP (User-Operation-Data Asset-Access
Path) model reply on the classification of
work role and data asset.  Similarly, access
control models such as role based access
models and Lattice based access models
[Harris, 2012] all rely on such on the
classification or labeling of subjects and
objects. The role based access control models
classify users to a set of work roles and each
role is assigned with a set of access privileges.
A subject (or a user) can exercise a
permission only if the permission is
authorized for the subject's (or user’s) active
role. The Lattice based access models are
mandatory access control models. The Bell-
LaPadula Model focuses on the protection of
confidentiality of information such that an
object (data) can only be read by a subject
(or a user) with higher (or equal) security
clearance and an object (data) can only be
write by a subject (or a user) with lower (or
equal) security clearance. The Biba Model
focuses on the protection of system integrity
such that an object (data) can only be write
by a subject (or a user) with higher (or equal)
security clearance and an object (data) can
only be read by a subject (or a user) with
lower (or equal) security clearance. These
access control mechanisms can protect
confidentiality and integrity upon the
authorization of access requests from users,
however, they have no control on data after
accesses are granted. Also, insiders usually
have the desired access privileges to access
data objects, thus, access control mechanisms
will have limited effectiveness on inside
activity identification and tracking.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper addressed the data loss
prevention management problem in
healthcare enterprise environment. First, a
novel approach is provided to model inside
activities and a UODP inside activity
modeling mechanism is proposed. With
inside activities modeling, data loss paths
and threat vectors are formally described and
identified. Second, threat vectors and
potential data loss paths have been
investigated in a healthcare enterprise
environment. Threat vectors have been
enumerated and data loss statistics results
for some threat vectors have been collected
and analyzed. After that, issues on data loss
prevention and inside activity incident
identification, tracking, and reconstruction
are discussed. Finally, inside activities are
conducted in a simulated healthcare
environment, evidences of inside activities
are collected, analyzed and then modeled.
Evidence trees have been developed for inside
activities, which are expected to provide
guidance for internal activity incident
identification and reconstruction.
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